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I. INTRODUCTION
Patent law has long been used as an incentive-based monopoly system for 
encouraging the development of science and technology.  The government’s power 
to grant a legal monopoly in the form of a patent was originally expressed in the 
Constitution.2 Congress may grant exclusive rights “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of 
[s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to . . . [i]nventors the 
exclusive [r]ight to their . . . [d]iscoveries.”3
Since its Constitutional foundation, United States patent law has evolved to 
the system we know today.  Claims, currently the metes and bounds of the property 
right granted in the patent, were originally considered unnecessary; the 
specification was the vital part of the patent.4 Similarly, patent prosecution and 
examination procedures were originally viewed as cumbersome to the government 
and thus were not rigorously applied.5 Not until the nineteenth century were 
examination procedures, similar to the burdensome ones employed today by the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), made part of the Patent 
Act.6
One of the more drastic changes to patent law has arisen from a series of 
cases, originating with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc.7 In MedImmune, the Court allowed a licensee to bring a 
declaratory judgment action against a licensor without first repudiating the 
license.8 Additionally, in dicta, the Court obliterated the standard for bringing a 
declaratory judgment action in patent law cases.9 Subsequent cases have 
interpreted the MedImmune decision broadly, effectively altering the negotiating 
stances for both sides of a licensing arrangement, and making it easier for a 
prospective licensee/accused infringer to bring a declaratory judgment action 
seeking a statement of noninfringement, invalidity, or unenforceability.10
Part I of this paper will address relevant background information, including a 
brief discussion of the statutory requirements of patent law and the declaratory 
judgment act.  Part II will discuss the MedImmune decision in detail.  Part III will 
discuss the progeny of the MedImmune decision, highlighting six cases.  Part IV 
will discuss how potential licensing relationships have been altered in light of 
MedImmune and its progeny.  Finally, Part V is a brief conclusion.
This line 
of cases has left patent law and subsequently patent valuation in flux.
2
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3
Id.
4
JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 54 (2d ed. 2006).
5
See F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 19-20 (4th ed. 2008).
6
Id. at 19-21; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 131-35 (2006).
7
549 U.S. 118 (2007).
8
Id.
9
Id. at 132 n.11 (Scalia, J., dictum).
10
See infra Part III.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Patent Law Background
Outside of the difficult prosecution and examination procedures, there are 
four distinct statutory “hurdles” an inventor must overcome to be awarded a patent 
by the USPTO.11
Section 101 of the Patent Act incorporates both the patentable subject matter 
and the utility requirements.
This section will detail each of the following four requirements: 
patentable subject matter, utility, novelty/loss of right, and obviousness.  
12  It states, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.”13 The patentable 
subject matter requirement is embodied in the words “process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter.”14 While these words are highly 
ambiguous in their statutory state, case law attempts to define them, with mixed 
results.  In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 15 the Supreme Court held that any item that 
was manmade and not naturally occurring was a composition of matter.16 The 
Diamond decision has greatly expanded patentable subject matter, as anything 
manmade is now arguably a composition of matter, and thus patentable subject 
matter.17 What is certain about patentable subject matter is that “laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable subject matter.18 Thus, 
potentially anything man-made is patentable subject matter; however, laws of 
nature and similar natural phenomena are not.19
Similar to the broad standard of patentable subject matter, the utility hurdle 
is easy to surpass.  The utility requirement is also found in section 101 in the 
statements “useful process,” “manufacture,” and “useful improvement.”20 The 
burden to prove that an invention is not useful rests with the USPTO.21 The 
USPTO, to bar an applicant under the utility provision, must show by clear and 
convincing evidence that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have 
reasonably doubted the invention’s utility.22 Additionally, a patent applicant need 
only show that his or her invention “is capable of providing some identifiable 
benefit” to meet the utility requirement.23
11
See 35 U.S.C. § 101(2006).
Thus, overcoming both the patentable 
subject matter and utility requirements is relatively straightforward and easily 
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
16
Id. at 309.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
21
In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
22
Id.
23
Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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achievable for an inventor.
The novelty provisions of the Patent Act are codified in section 102, 
subsections (a), (e), and (g).24 The novelty provision is part of the driving force 
behind the incentive for encouraging advancement in technology and the 
sciences.25 The legal monopoly given with a patent is not handed out for 
inventions that are not “new.”26 Any information that predates the inventor’s own 
date of invention (known as “prior art”) that would enable a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to use the invention, will “anticipate” the invention, making 
it not novel.27  Prior art can be found in another patent or printed publication that 
has been publically issued in any country in the world.28 Also, prior art, as long it 
was publically known or used in the United States, regardless if it is in written 
form, will serve as novelty-barring prior art.29
Next, the loss of right (known as “statutory bars”) provision is found in 
section 102(b).30 This provision works to bar an inventor from getting a patent 
which introduces the invention to the public too far in advance of seeking a 
patent.31 The policy behind this provision is that the public will come to rely on an 
invention, and, if not given notice that the invention is patented, the public will 
consider the invention as part of the public domain.32 The loss of right bar 
depends on the invention’s “critical date.”33 This is the date that is exactly one 
year prior to the date of application to the USPTO.34 If the inventor has previously 
patented or described the invention in a printed publication in the United States or 
a foreign country, or places the invention in public use or on sale, earlier than the 
critical date, the inventor may no longer patent his or her invention.35
A further hurdle to obtaining a patent is the obviousness requirement found 
in section 103.36 This provision is employed to prevent inventions that meet the 
technical requirements of section 102, but do not truly advance technology and the 
sciences.37 The obviousness provision is judged by whether a person having 
ordinary skill in the art would have found the invention obvious at the time of 
conception.38 The actual application of the obviousness requirement has been 
performed according to the factors set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 39
24
§ 102 (a), (e), (g).
a 
25
1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.01 (2006).
26
Id.
27
§ 102(a).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. § 102(b).
31
Id.
32
CHISUM, supra note 25, at § 3.01.
33
Id.
34
Id. § 102(b).
35
Id.
36
Id. § 103
37
Id. § 103(a)  
38
Id.
39
383 U.S. 1 (1966).   
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highly fact-based analysis involving the prior art, the ordinary skill in the art, and 
secondary considerations.40 Interestingly, the Supreme Court recently sent the 
obviousness analysis into flux in the landmark case, KSR International Co. v. 
Teleflex Inc.41 In KSR, the Court held that everyday common sense and 
information found implicitly within the prior art could be applied in the 
obviousness analysis.42
In conclusion, if an inventor is able to surpass all of the above hurdles, he or 
she may be entitled to a patent.  There are also requirements related to the manner 
in which the patent application is written,
Thus, the current state of obviousness analysis is 
uncertain, but the analysis is at least less favorable to patent holders and applicants 
than it was prior to KSR.
43 but they are beyond the scope of this 
paper.  Once an inventor is awarded a patent, he or she is given a legal monopoly 
to exclude all others from making, using, selling, or importing that invention in the 
United States.44
B. Declaratory Judgment Background
After the patent issues, during litigation, the patent itself is still 
susceptible to being invalidated or held unenforceable.  One manner in which a 
potential infringer, be it a licensee or another party, can attempt to invalidate a 
patent is through declaratory judgment.
Declaratory judgment is a procedural mechanism where a party, who is 
uncertain of his or her legal position, can have that position adjudicated in a federal 
court.45 In terms of patent cases, the litigants’ roles in a declaratory judgment 
action are generally reversed.46 Usually, the patent owner is the defendant, and the 
accused infringer is the plaintiff.47 Interestingly, an empirical study done by Judge 
Kimberly Moore revealed that there is a statistically significant difference between 
a patent owner’s success rate in litigation when he or she is a plaintiff compared to 
when he or she is a declaratory judgment defendant.48 The data shows that when a 
patent owner asserts a claim in an infringement suit, he or she is victorious fifty-
eight percent of the time.49 When one is the declaratory judgment defendant, 
however, he or she is victorious only forty-four percent of the time.50
40
Id. at 17-18.
The exact 
reason for this discrepancy is unknown, but Judge Moore hypothesizes that the 
difference is in part due to the accused infringer’s benefit of choosing when and 
41
‘550 U.S. 398 (2007).
42
Id. at 420.  
43
See § 112.
44
Id. § 154(a).
45
Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006).
46
Kimberly Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases:  Does Geographic Choice Affect 
Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 920 (2001).
47
Id.
48
Id. at 920-21.
49
Id. at 921.
50
Id.
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where the declaratory judgment suit will commence.51
Prior to the enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”) in 1934,52
potential targets of patent infringement suits were in a difficult position, with 
almost no bargaining leverage. Therefore, prior to 1934, a party informed of his or 
her likely-infringing status had three options: (1) sign a license agreement at 
whatever price the licensor commanded; (2) wait for a high-priced lawsuit to be 
filed in the local federal district court; or (3) completely abandon the industry, 
never knowing if he or she was actually infringing.  To alleviate some of the 
problems with this situation, Congress enacted the DJA.53
The DJA was enacted in 1934, and with amendments currently reads: “[i]n a 
case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United 
States. . .may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party 
seeking such declaration.”54 Shortly after the enactment of the original DJA, the 
Supreme Court decided Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth.55 The Court held 
that the DJA was constitutional and that the use of the phrase “actual controversy”
refers only to the “case or controversy” requirement found in Article III of the 
Constitution.56 The Court reasoned that as long as the parties possessed adverse 
legal interests and their dispute was not a hypothetical one, a federal court may 
exercise jurisdiction.57 The Court later elaborated on the test for an “actual 
controversy” stating the question is “whether the facts alleged, under all the 
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having 
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance 
of a declaratory judgment.”58 However, the Court warned that the question of 
whether a set of circumstances was within a federal court’s declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction is one of factual degree, and that fashioning a precise test would be 
difficult.59
In spite of the Court’s warning that it would be difficult to articulate a 
precise test to determine whether a declaratory judgment jurisdiction exists, the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) did just that.60 Shortly after 
the CAFC’s inception, they articulated a two-part test for determining the actual 
controversy aspect of patent declaratory judgment jurisdiction, which stood until 
the MedImmune decision.61 First, the declaratory judgment defendant/patent
owner must have engaged in conduct that created a “reasonable apprehension” of 
suit on the part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff.62
51
Id. at 921-22.
Second, the declaratory 
52
Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006).
53
§ 2201.
54
Id.
55
300 U.S. 227 (1937).
56
Id. at 239-40.
57
Id. at 240-41.
58
Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).
59
Id.
60
See Jervis B. Webb Co. v. S. Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388 (Fed. Cir 1984).
61
Id.
62
Id. at 1398-99 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 880-81 (Fed. Cir. 
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judgment plaintiff must be either involved in, or prepared to be involved in, an 
activity that could be construed as infringement.63
Additionally, a discretionary component exists for declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction determination.  The DJA states that where there is an actual 
controversy, courts of the United States may declare the rights of the parties.
If these two requirements are 
met, declaratory judgment jurisdiction may be present.
64
The DJA does not provide unlimited discretion to turn away declaratory 
judgment actions.  The CAFC does have the power to reverse a lower court’s
decision to dismiss a declaratory judgment action on discretionary grounds based 
on different findings.
Prior to MedImmune, if a court found, based on an objective standard, a 
declaratory judgment plaintiff possessed a “reasonable apprehension” that a patent 
infringement suit was to be commenced against him or her, and he or she was 
undertaking an activity that could be construed as infringement, the court would 
likely decide the discretionary component. 
65 The Supreme Court, however, has left some power with 
the district courts to make decisions on discretionary grounds by creating a 
deferential standard of review.  The standard of review in discretionary declaratory 
judgment dismissals is an abuse of discretion, rather than a de novo review.66
Thus, the power to dismiss a declaratory judgment action on discretionary grounds 
is highly fact specific and can be overturned, but there is deference to a district 
court’s decision to dismiss.67
Declaratory judgment actions, in the context of licensing, have evolved over 
time.  Prior to Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 68 a licensee was estopped from asserting 
patent invalidity or unenforceability in a suit for royalties under a license 
agreement.69 This legal theory, licensee estoppel, was abolished in Lear in favor of 
the public policy of testing the validity of a patent and determining what inventions 
are truly parts of the public domain.70
The CAFC’s interpretation of Lear has changed over time.  Initially, the 
CAFC took the approach that a declaratory judgment proceeding is not barred 
simply because the license agreement is still in effect.71 The court reasoned that a 
contrary position would violate the policy set forth in Lear that patents should be 
contested, and often licensees are the only parties who can bring suit.72
1983) (articulating the reasonable apprehension factor). 
Between 
1983 and 2004, the CAFC continued to reign in the Lear policy and made it more 
difficult for a licensee to bring a declaratory judgment action against a licensor 
63
Jervis B. Webb, 742 F.2d at 1399.
64
Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2004).
65
Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
66
Wilton v. Seven Falls, Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1995).
67
See id.
68
395 U.S. 653, 656 (1969).
69
Id. at 656.
70
Id. at 670.
71
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 880 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
72
Id.
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without first repudiating the license.73 Finally, in Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 74
the CAFC held that a licensee, in good standing, who has not repudiated the 
license agreement, does not have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action.75
The court reasoned that no sufficient “actual controversy” existed between Gen-
Probe and Vysis until the license agreement had been repudiated by a material 
breach.76 Thus, prior to MedImmune, a licensee wishing to bring a declaratory 
judgment action seeking to have a patent invalidated or found unenforceable, first 
must repudiate the license.77 All of this, however, was changed by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in MedImmune and its progeny.78
III. THE MEDIMMUNE DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
The dispute in MedImmune arose as a result of a license agreement signed in 
1997.79 MedImmune, the licensee, signed an agreement with Genentech, the 
licensor/patent assignee, to license the Cabilly I patent and the then-pending 
Cabilly II patent application.80 MedImmune was entitled to make, use, and sell the 
subject matter of the Cabilly I patent, a chimeric antibody, which it used in its 
drug, Synagis.81 Synagis accounted for eighty percent of MedImmune’s revenue 
in 1999.82 For use of the Cabilly I patent in the manufacture of Synagis and the 
application covered in the Cabilly II patent application, MedImmune paid 
Genentech royalties.83
In December 2001, however, upon the maturation of the Cabilly II 
application into an issued patent, Genentech decided that more royalties were 
owed.84 Soon after the Cabilly II patent issued, Genentech informed MedImmune 
that it desired further royalty payments beginning March 1, 2002.85 This was a 
signal to MedImmune that Genentech would enforce the Cabilly II patent, perhaps 
terminate the original license agreement, and sue MedImmune for willful patent 
infringement.86
73
See e.g., Studiengesellschaft Kohle, M.B.H. v. Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 
1997); Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1224-26 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Although MedImmune believed the Cabilly II patent to be both 
unenforceable and invalid, it did not wish to risk losing a potential willful patent 
infringement suit, the results of which could be an order to pay treble damages and 
74
359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
75
Id. at 1381-82.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
79
Id.
80
Id. at 122.
81
Id. at 121.
82
Id. at 122.
83
MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 122.
84
Id. at 121.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 122.
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attorney’s fees, in addition to losing a product that produced so much revenue.87
MedImmune, therefore, continued to pay royalties “under protest.”88
Although MedImmune continued to pay Genentech its royalties, it filed a 
declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California.89 MedImmune sought a declaratory judgment that Synagis 
did not infringe any claim of the Cabilly II patent (valid or not) and that the Cabilly 
II patent was both unenforceable and invalid.90 The district court, relying on the 
CAFC’s decision in Gen-Probe, dismissed the declaratory judgment action 
because MedImmune was still in paying royalties and had not repudiated the 
license agreement, thus there was no “reasonable apprehension” of suit brought 
against them.91 The CAFC affirmed the district court’s decision.92 MedImmune 
sought and received certiorari.93
B. The Issue94
The issue before the Court was whether a licensee, who is threatened with a 
potential infringement suit and loss of a majority of their revenue, without ceasing 
royalty payments and repudiating the license agreement, can bring an action for 
declaratory relief and meet the requirement of the case or controversy standard of 
Article III.95
C. The Rationale96
The Court began its analysis by looking at whether a plaintiff is required to 
expose him or herself to potential liability before bringing a declaratory judgment 
suit against the government; for example, in alleging that a statute is 
unconstitutional.97 The Court stated that by not violating a potentially 
unconstitutional law, the threat of imminent suit (prosecution in this case) was 
eliminated; however, Article III jurisdiction remained.98 The Court reasoned that 
jurisdiction was present because the fear of prosecution effectively coerced the 
plaintiff to not violate the law, and that “the declaratory judgment procedure [was] 
an alternative to pursuit of the arguable illegal activity.”99
87
Id.
88
Id. at 122.
89
See MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 122; MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. CV 03-2567 MPR 
(CTx),  2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28680 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2004).
90
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 961-63 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
91
See id. at 961; see also Jervis B. Webb Co. v. S. Sys. Inc., 742 F.2d 1388, 1398-99 (Fed. Cir. 
1984); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 881 (Fed Cir. 1983).
92
C.R. Bard, 716 F.2d at 881.
93
MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 122.
94
Id. at 125.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 126-37.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 128.
99
MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 129 (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 480 (1974) (Rehnquist, 
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The Court then analyzed its application of the DJA to a plaintiff who is 
coerced, not by the government, but by a private party, to self-avoid an imminent 
injury.100 Surprisingly, the only Supreme Court precedent on point was Altvater v. 
Freeman, 101 a patent licensing case.102 In Altvater, the Court held that a 
declaratory judgment suit involving the validity of a patent was not non-justiciable 
simply because of the licensee’s failure to cease royalty payments.103 Similar to 
MedImmune, royalties were being paid under protest, with the licensee paying 
simply to avoid an infringement suit.104  The CAFC, in Gen-Probe, distinguished 
Altvater because it involved an injunction; however, the Court disagreed with that 
rationale.105 Although the injunction was issued by the judiciary, the Court stated 
that even more pressing than a potential government sanction for violation of the 
injunction, was the threat of serious injury to the licensee’s business.106 The Court 
reasoned that a looming injury to a licensee’s business can be just as coercive as 
government action.107 Thus, the idea of coercion, either by governmental 
prosecution or by the potential of a patent infringement suit, potentially leading to 
damages and loss of revenue, is enough to satisfy the Article III requirements to 
bring a declaratory judgment action.108 Therefore, with the specific facts present 
in this case, the threat of paying treble damages, attorney’s fees, in addition to 
potentially losing eighty percent of their revenue; MedImmune was effectively 
coerced into continuing to pay royalties, albeit “under protest.”109
Interestingly, in its analysis, the Court effectively destroyed the CAFC’s
“reasonable apprehension” test.110 In footnote eleven, the Court stated that the test 
was incompatible with its precedent; reasoning that no apprehension of suit was 
necessary to bring a declaratory judgment action.111
Finally, Genentech argued that the MedImmune’s suit should be dismissed 
on discretionary grounds.112 The Court stated that due to the district court’s
outright dismissal of the declaratory judgment suit, they could not decide this issue 
and it would have to be decided on remand.113
J., concurring)).
100
Id. at 129-32.
101
319 U.S. 359 (1943).
102
Id.
103
Id. at 364-65.
104
See id. 
105
MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 132.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 132-34.
109
Id. at 130-31, 134-36.
110
Id. at 132.
111
MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 132.
112
Id. at 136-37.
113
Id.
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D. The Holding and Potential Impact on Licensing114
In the end, the Court held that MedImmune was not required, as far as 
Article III jurisdiction is concerned, to cease royalty payments or to repudiate its 
license agreement, in order to bring a declaratory judgment action in federal 
court.115
The potential impact on licensing is seen in several ways.  First, one 
traditional way in which two parties could avoid the extreme costs of a patent 
infringement suit would be to agree to a license.  In light of MedImmune, a 
putative infringer can agree to a license, claim they were coerced into signing 
through fear of suit, and then bring a declaratory judgment action, putting the 
patent owner/licensor on the defensive.  Second, some commentators say that 
MedImmune may drastically affect the transaction costs of licensing.
  Thus, MedImmune was free to continue its declaratory action seeking a 
judgment stating that the Cabilly II patent was not infringed, invalid, and 
unenforceable.
116 Licensors 
may be forced to both alter the manner in which the license agreement is drafted 
(including clauses regarding validity challenges) and calculating costs, by building 
in the costs of the potential declaratory judgment litigation into the royalties and 
other fees associated with the license; thus, making the entire transaction more 
expensive.117 Finally, as far as existing license agreements are concerned, 
licensors will have to be very careful not to suggest anything remotely concerning 
litigation or anything that could be construed as a threat.118
IV. THE PROGENY OF MEDIMMUNE
Although these 
concerns are just a few, many more concerns began cropping up after the progeny 
of MedImmune began to be decided.  
Since the Supreme Court decided MedImmune, the CAFC has handed down 
several cases interpreting MedImmune’s holding.  Four cases119 have interpreted 
MedImmune broadly; finding declaratory judgment jurisdiction in factual situations 
that would not have existed pre-MedImmune.  However, one other CAFC120 case 
and a recent case from the district court in Delaware121
114
Id. at 137. 
have shown that 
declaratory judgment does still have its limits.
115
Id.
116
Bryan C. Diner & Ali Ahmed, United States: In the Aftermath of MedImmune v. Genentech, Is 
It All Doom and Gloom for Licensors or Are There Rays of Hope in the Future?, BNA INT’L IP &
TECH. PROGRAMME, April 2007, available at . http://www.thefreelibrary.com/In+The+Aftermath+Of+
Medimmune+v.+Genentech,+Is+It+All+Doom+And+Gloom...-a0166210098.  
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm, Inc., 501 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian 
Media Tech., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 
482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007); 
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
120
Benitec Austl., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
121
Edmunds Holding Co. v. Autobytel, Inc., Civ. No. 08-149-SLR, 2009 WL 424250 (D. Del. 
2009).
50 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:I
A. SanDisk v. STMicroelectronics
SanDisk was the first post-MedImmune declaratory judgment case to come 
out of the CAFC, and thus, was the first to interpret MedImmune.122  The facts of 
SanDisk differed from MedImmune in that there was no existing licensing 
relationship; the plaintiff and defendant were merely in negotiations for a 
license.123 STMicroelectronics (“ST”) owned several patents relating to flash 
memory storage and wished to license them to SanDisk when it discovered that 
products SanDisk was selling were possibly infringing.124 ST presented claim 
charts to SanDisk and noted that SanDisk’s products were likely infringing, but 
also mentioned that “ST has absolutely no plan whatsoever to sue SanDisk.”125
SanDisk claimed its products were not infringing and eventually license 
negotiations broke down.126 Later, SanDisk filed a declaratory judgment action 
alleging ST’s patents were not infringed and were invalid.127
At the district court level, the action was dismissed because no “reasonable 
apprehension” of imminent suit was present, but by the time the case made it to the 
CAFC, MedImmune had already been decided, which drastically changed the 
CAFC’s analysis.128 The issue that faced the CAFC was whether the “actual 
controversy” requirement of the DJA was met by the specific facts of this case and 
thus, whether the case could proceed.129
To address the main issue, the CAFC first focused on the Supreme Court’s
rejection of the “reasonable apprehension” test in footnote eleven in MedImmune;
recognizing the fact that the test was effectively obliterated.130 From the rejection 
of the CAFC’s prior declaratory judgment test, the court went on to greatly expand 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction.131 The CAFC stated that jurisdiction will not be 
present when a potential licensee learns of a patent and that their product or 
process might infringe; however, when a potential licensor makes an affirmative 
move, in addition to the above, jurisdiction could be present.132
[T]hat where a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain 
identified ongoing or planned activity of another party, and where that party 
contends that it has the right to engage in the accused activity without license, an 
Article III case or controversy will arise and the party need not risk a suit for 
infringement by engaging in the identified activity before seeking a declaration of 
The CAFC 
broadly held:
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its legal rights.133
This holding effectively set down a rule so broad that as soon as a potential 
licensor is informed by a patent owner that a product or process they are making, 
using, or selling, may potentially read onto another’s patent, declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction will be present.  
Under the facts of this case, the CAFC found an actual controversy to exist, 
even though there was an explicit promise not to file an infringement suit on the 
part of ST.134 ST’s preparation of claim charts and other studies of SanDisk’s
products,135 together with their interest in meeting about a potential license, was 
enough to create an “actual controversy.”136 In fact, the CAFC referred to this 
strategy as the kind of “extra-judicial patent enforcement with scare-the-customer-
and-run tactics that the [DJA] was intended to obviate.”137
Of note is Judge Bryson’s concurring opinion.
This was truly a 
sweeping change from the old CAFC test.
138  This concurrence pointed 
out the different result that would have occurred under the “reasonable 
apprehension” test,139 as well as notes that the CAFC’s holding in this case is 
broad-sweeping and will not be remotely limited to the facts of this case.140
In conclusion, SanDisk effectively alters any proposal for a license 
agreement; save for a set of facts involving a potential licensee not currently 
manufacturing a potentially infringing product.  Any patent owner wishing to 
avoid the costs of litigation and enter a license agreement through well-balanced 
negotiation must now be wary of a declaratory judgment action.  This is further 
seen in the next case, one decided only a few days after SanDisk.
B. Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.
Although Teva does not involve a licensing relationship, it does further 
illustrate the CAFC’s declaratory judgment jurisprudence.141 Novartis owned five 
patents relating to the drug, Famvir; one relating to the active ingredient itself, and 
the other four relating to methods associated with the drug.142 All five of these 
patents were listed in the FDA’s Orange Book.143
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patents was either invalid or noninfringed by Teva’s generic drug.144 Novartis 
filed a patent infringement suit based solely on the active ingredient patent, not 
suing on the other four patents.145 Teva then filed a declaratory judgment action 
based on the other four patents, claiming that they were not infringed and 
invalid.146 Similar to MedImmune and SanDisk, the district court dismissed the 
action based on a lack of an objective-based “reasonable apprehension” of suit 
because Novartis had never threatened suit on any of the four remaining patents.147
The CAFC took the case and would reverse.148
Once again, the CAFC pronounced the death of the “reasonable 
apprehension” test, reiterating the amorphous standard originally espoused in 
Maryland Casualty.149 That standard being under all of the circumstances,
whether there is a controversy between parties having adverse legal interests that 
warrants an immediate issuance of declaratory judgment.150 In this case, the 
CAFC focused on five different circumstances, leading to the conclusion that this 
test is now a one of “totality of the circumstances.”151 The five were: (1) Novartis’
listing of all the patents in the Orange Book – this provided notice alone, but was 
not an affirmative act; (2) Teva’s ANDA certification stating its generic did not 
infringe Novartis’ patents/the patents were invalid; (3) statutory provisions in the 
Hatch-Waxman on achieving “patent certainty”; (4) Novartis actually bringing suit 
on its active ingredient patent; and (5) the potential of Novartis’ strategy leading to 
multiple infringement suits against Teva.152
All together, these factors illustrate that after SanDisk and Teva, the 
“reasonable apprehension” test is dead and the current standard is amorphous, 
highly fact-based, and judged by on a totality of the circumstances approach.  
C. Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Guardian Media Technologies., Ltd.
Sony is very similar to SanDisk, in that it involved pre-licensing 
negotiations.153 Guardian, owner of two different patents on V-Chip technology, 
noted that several electronics manufacturers, including Sony, were producing 
products that potentially infringed their patents.154 Initially, Guardian informed 
these manufacturers of their potentially infringing status and provided claim charts 
comparing the specific claims of Guardian’s patents to the accused devices.155
144
Id. 
  In 
145
Id. at 1334-35.
146
Id. at 1335.
147
Teva, 482 F.3d at 1335.
148
Id. at 1346.
149
Id. at 1339.
150
Id. at 1339 n.2.
151
Id. at 1340.
152
Id. at 1340-41.
153
Sony Elecs, Inc. v. Guardian Media Tech., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
154
Id. at 1281.
155
Id. at 1273-74.
2009 TECHNOLOGY LICENSING 53
response, the manufacturers noted potentially patent-invalidating prior art.156
Eventually, Guardian offered the manufacturers a discounted license and the 
parties later met to negotiate.157 Negotiations failed and the electronics 
manufacturers filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a statement that 
Guardian’s patents were not infringed, invalid, and unenforceable.158 Similar to 
the previous cases, the district court dismissed, relying on the CAFC’s old 
“reasonable apprehension” test because Guardian never threatened suit and the 
action was commenced while the parties were still negotiating.159 The CAFC 
accepted the case on appeal.160
Using the rationale from SanDisk, the CAFC found that there was 
jurisdiction for the declaratory judgment action.161 The CAFC stated that even 
though a potential licensee is willing to partake in negotiations, this does not 
destroy their right to bring a declaratory judgment action.162  The CAFC reasoned 
that there is no requirement that a potential licensee should put themselves at risk 
of an infringement suit by continuing to engage in the putatively infringing activity 
without first seeking a declaration of its rights via declaratory judgment.163 The 
manufacturers had no requirement to continue licensing negotiations; they could 
terminate them at will.164 In fact, the CAFC held that as soon as Guardian stated it 
was due royalties for specific past and ongoing activities and the manufacturers 
disagreed with that assertion, declaratory judgment jurisdiction was present.165
Sony further illustrates how little a potential licensor must do to create 
jurisdiction for a declaratory action.  Once again, simply approaching a potential 
licensee to avoid the costs of pricey patent litigation could put the validity and 
enforceability of a potential licensor’s at stake in a declaratory judgment action.
D. Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm, Inc.
Similar to both MedImmune and SanDisk, the CAFC also held in Adenta that 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction was present.166 Adenta is similar to Medimmune
in that there is a dispute over language used by a patent owner when 
communicating with a licensee regarding possible litigation threats, and the fact 
that there is already an existing licensing relationship.167
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case for lack of declaratory judgment jurisdiction.168 Here, the district court found 
that the language used by OrthoArm’s patent assignee (“[assignee] would pursue 
its available legal remedies to protect its rights”)169 was sufficient to create a 
“reasonable apprehension” of imminent suit, in response to the licensee, Adenta, 
threatening to stop payment of royalties because of some potentially patent-
invaliding information it discovered.170 In fact, the district court allowed this case 
to reach a jury verdict, and the appeal to the CAFC was regarding the issue of 
whether or not the district court erred in not dismissing the case for lack of 
jurisdiction.171
Although Adenta did eventually cease some royalty payments, which itself 
created declaratory judgment jurisdiction, that was not necessary to bring this 
action.172 The CAFC stated that as soon as OrthoArm’s assignee announced it 
would pursue its legal remedies to protect its rights in response to Adenta’s
statement that it would cease royalty payments, the two parties were at adverse 
legal positions.173 Thus, when parties are at adverse legal positions and the matter 
warrants an immediate judicial declaration, jurisdiction is present.174
E. Benitec v. Nucleonics and Edmonds Holding Co. v. Autobytel
The previous four cases indicate how the CAFC has broadly interpreted the 
Supreme Court’s MedImmune decision.  As it currently stands, almost every 
potential licensor who contacts a party that may be infringing would be remiss to 
not worry about a declaratory judgment action being filed soon thereafter, alleging 
invalidity and non-infringement.  In spite of the ease with which a licensee could 
bring a declaratory judgment action, there have been some cases attempting to rein 
in declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
F. Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc.
Benitec demonstrates that there are still some limits on declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction.175 Benitec originally sued Nucleonics over an RNAi technology 
patent, alleging infringement for Nucleonics’ use of the technology in human 
medical applications.176 Nucleonics counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory 
judgment that Benitec’s patent was invalid and that it was protected based on 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e).177
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is filed with the FDA;178 this provision also was given an expansive reading by the 
Supreme Court while Benitec was pending in the district court.179 In light of the
Supreme Court’s reading of Section 271(e), Benitec moved to dismiss its own 
claims because Nucleonics’ activities were covered under the exception and there 
was no longer a colorable claim of infringement.180 Nucleonics wished to proceed 
on its declaratory judgment action, but the district court dismissed the action for 
lack of jurisdiction because the parties were no longer adverse.181 The CAFC took 
the case to determine whether there was still jurisdiction in light of the recent 
MedImmune/SanDisk rationale.182
The CAFC affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction.183 The court found that Nucleonics had failed to show there was an 
“actual controversy” of sufficient and immediate reality to support jurisdiction.184
The CAFC reasoned that the burden of proof is on the party seeking declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction to establish that jurisdiction exists at the time the claim is 
filed and continues to exist.185 Here, jurisdiction plainly existed at the time the 
declaratory action was filed;186 however, upon Benitec’s voluntary dismissal of its 
claim recognizing that Nucleonics’ current actions are immune from an 
infringement suit, jurisdiction ceased to exist.187  There was no longer jurisdiction 
because the parties were no longer legally adverse in a manner that warranted 
immediate declaratory relief.188 Jurisdiction could be regained if the situation 
changed.  If, as Nucleonics argues, it files a New Drug Application based on its 
RNAi work, or if it changed fields in which it was using the technology, from 
human medical applications to animal husbandry ones, jurisdiction would be 
present.189 The CAFC agreed with those statements, but stated that those events 
were too far in the future to be certain enough to satisfy the jurisdictional 
requirements.190
Finally, a holding of no declaratory judgment jurisdiction was supported by 
Benitec’s promise not to sue.191 The CAFC rationalized that Benitec’s statement 
that it would not file suit was different than ST’s assertion that it did not intend to 
sue.192
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plans to infringe Benitec’s patent in a totality of the circumstances analysis to 
affirm the dismissal of Nucelonics’ declaratory judgment action.  
Benitec does have an impact on declaratory judgment.  Prior to this case, it 
was unclear how certain the controversy must be between the two parties before 
the matter was ripe enough to be heard.  After Benitec it is clear that a future 
controversy that is not reasonably certain to exist, is not enough to obtain 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction.  From the rationale, it seems possible that 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction can be destroyed after an action commences by a 
dismissing a patent infringement suit (if one exists) and promising not to sue over 
existing products.
G. Edmunds Holding Co. v. Autobytel, Inc.
In early 2009, a district court in Delaware decided a case that further 
attempted to control the MedImmune line of rationale.193 Edmunds Holding 
Company and Autobytel were both companies involved in an industry where 
businesses sell sales leads on potential automobile buyers to retailers.194 Autobytel 
owns a method patent directed toward distribution of these sales leads.195 Prior to 
the initiation of this declaratory action, Autobytel had vigorously asserted their 
patent rights.196 Autobytel previously commented in a business magazine that it 
would assert its rights through litigation,197 as well as instituted patent 
infringement suits against several competitors, three of which were customers of 
Edmunds.198 Significantly, Autobytel never communicated with Edmunds, never 
asking Edmunds to enter into a license agreement with them.199 After initiation of 
the declaratory judgment action, Autobytel sought to have the action dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction, claiming that there was no “case or actual controversy,” as is 
required by the DJA and the MedImmune line of cases.200
In deciding that no declaratory judgment jurisdiction is present, the court 
differentiated the facts in this case from those of MedImmune and its progeny.201
In all of the previously described cases, the patent owner had communicated in 
some fashion with the declaratory judgment plaintiff.202 Here, Autobytel never 
communicated with Edmunds, although they did have a reputation for being 
litigious and stated that they would protect their intellectual property.203
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act is a significant hurdle to finding jurisdiction present.204 The court stated that 
Autobytel’s litigation history combined with its statements about protecting its 
intellectual property was not enough to create an “actual controversy.”205 The 
court also stated that there was no imminent fear of suit and that with none of these 
factors present, the controversy here was at best “speculative” and “one-sided.”206
In conclusion, these cases, starting with MedImmune v. Genentech, have 
truly reshaped declaratory judgment jurisdiction jurisprudence, but not necessarily 
in the best way possible.  The CAFC’s objective “reasonable apprehension” test 
was nearly completely abrogated by MedImmune’s footnote eleven, and was fully 
abandoned by the CAFC in SanDisk.  As of now, it is difficult to imagine a 
situation where a patent owner, wishing to avoid litigation, could contact a 
potential licensee, and not have to fear being served with a declaratory judgment 
complaint.  This line of cases has already impacted technology licensing, and will 
continue to do so as long as the current standards remain.
Thus, this case leaves declaratory judgment jurisprudence in a state that does not 
explicitly require an overt act toward a plaintiff by a defendant, but a lack of that 
act is difficult to overcome.
V. IMPACTS ON LICENSING AND VALUATION
At the very least, the MedImmune line of cases has re-shaped the licensing 
relationship. MedImmune and Adenta affect existing license relationships, whereas 
SanDisk and Sony affect pre-license negotiations, thus, all phases of licensing are 
in new territory.  
A. Existing License Relationships
Prior to MedImmune, a licensor in an existing license relationship had little 
to worry about, until the licensee ceased royalty payments, or otherwise repudiated 
the license agreement, potentially risking a willful infringement suit.  Then, to 
confer declaratory judgment jurisdiction on a licensee, the licensor would have to 
threaten the licensee with the infringement suit.  This was the rule of Gen-Probe; a 
licensee in good standing had no grounds to bring a declaratory judgment 
action.207 Now, in light of MedImmune, a licensor must worry about the vastly
increased likelihood of litigation.  Currently, a licensor who communicates with a 
licensee about perhaps changing either the royalty rate or some other provision in 
the license has created an adverse legal relationship, effectively conferring 
declaratory action jurisdiction.208
This shift in the existing license landscape has decidedly slanted the playing 
field toward the licensee.209
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the licensor wishes to alter the contract, the licensor must now consider 
MedImmune in their negotiating tactics.210 If a licensor wishes not to worry about 
litigation that may lead to their patent being found invalid or unenforceable, the 
licensor may now have to sacrifice license alterations it feels are owed in light of 
changes in the conditions or context of the license. Unfortunately for the licensor, 
there is little that can be done if there is already an existing license agreement.211
Licensors should take great care in drafting all communications to the licensee, 
making sure that no language could be construed as a threat.212 Perhaps a licensor 
could attempt to renegotiate a license, incorporating provisions that may be 
beneficial in minimizing the impact of MedImmune.  However, with the current 
broad jurisdiction standard, that letter itself may be enough to confer the licensee 
with jurisdiction.213
B. Future License Agreements
Prior to SanDisk and Sony, a patent owner who learned of a potential 
infringer could ask an infringer to enter into a license agreement.  This was a 
simple, relatively non-adversarial manner in which to conduct business that was 
beneficial to both parties.  Each party received what they wanted; the accused 
infringer could continue on in its business, legitimized by the license agreement, 
and the patent owner would be satisfied by being compensated for the use of its 
patent rights.  Most importantly, neither would face the prospect of a costly patent 
infringement suit.  
After SanDisk and Sony, things have changed, favoring the accused 
infringer/potential licensee.214
Outside of changes in licensing agreement drafting, there are two other 
possible means a patent owner might be able to use that stem the effects of 
SanDisk and Sony. First, the patent owner can threaten a suit, with a complaint in 
No longer can a patent owner send a letter to a 
potential infringer informing them that their product may be infringing and that a 
license may be in order; this could be enough to confer declaratory action 
jurisdiction.  One possible solution would be to send a very general letter to a 
potential licensee informing them that licenses are available for the general
products they manufacture, making sure to never specify exactly which products 
and never mentioning infringement.  However, no licensee would enter a license
agreement without having more specifics, and once those specifics are revealed, 
based on Sony and SanDisk, a declaratory action could be instituted.  Important to 
note is that even the statement that there is no intention to file an infringement 
could not save ST in SanDisk, so a unilateral promise on the part of the patent 
owner might not be enough to stop a declaratory judgment action.
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hand, inform the potential infringer of this fact, and that unless a contract stating 
that neither party will file suit (a “stand still agreement”), the infringement action 
will commence.215
The second option to get around SanDisk is for a patent owner to file suit in 
district court, but to not serve the complaint immediately.
This could be difficult to implement for two reasons.  First, the 
patent owner must be willing to spend the resources to prosecute the infringement 
suit.  If not, they have given the accused infringer the ability to file a declaratory 
action judgment.  Second, this creates a more hostile environment for the licensing 
relationship.  It might be difficult to create an amicable business relationship when 
it begins in such a conflicted manner. 
216 This provides the 
patent owner with their choice of forum and gives them considerable leverage for 
negotiations.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that service must be made 
within 120 days, thus allowing the patent owner and the accused infringer 
approximately four months to negotiate.217
MedImmune and its progeny’s effects will be seen for many years to come.  
One thing is for sure, these cases will drastically affect the mind set of the potential 
licensor.  Not only will the licensor always have to bear in mind the possibility of 
litigation, but will have to alter their negotiation stance.  These cases will force 
licensors to either expect higher licensing fees to offset the greater potential for 
litigation or will lead to less technology licensing and transfer.  This latter option 
can have dire consequences for the growing global technology age; the less 
technology in the public domain, the more the technology age will slow down.
Once again, this may be a difficult 
manner in which to start a licensing relationship, but with SanDisk and Sony out 
there, any chance a patent owner has to equal the playing field must be used.
C. Impact on Patent Valuation
Intellectual property valuation is important for both legal and business 
reasons.  Legally, during and after litigation and in transactional matters such as 
bankruptcy, company reorganization, or a company transfer, the value of a patent 
may have to be determined for damages and other matters.218 Patent valuations in 
the business context may be necessary during mergers, acquisitions, spin-offs, and 
especially in licensing.219
Patent valuation is based on several elements, including a patent’s
uniqueness, breadth, competing technologies, time to commercialize, the market 
for the technology, and economic and legal influences on the future of the patent 
and the technology.220 One factor commonly associated with valuation in any 
context, is the amount of risk associated with that commodity.221
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of a patent has been described as a function of the risk associated with being able 
to enforce the patent’s rights and win a patent infringement suit, perhaps being 
awarded treble damages and attorney’s fees.222
After MedImmune, things have changed.
Prior to MedImmune, factors 
associated with the decision to bring an infringement suit compared entering 
license negotiations against the potential cost of the litigation, including how sure a 
party was that their patent was valid and enforceable.  However, during that 
calculus, they knew that as long as no threat was made to a putative infringer, their 
patent was safe from litigation, if they chose not to file suit; the risk to the patent 
itself was non-existent.  
223 The risk associated with 
enforcing a patent’s rights has gone up.  Previously, a patent owner could decide to 
enter into a license as a way of enforcing their rights, knowing that the patent was 
never at risk as long as there was no litigation.  Now, simply approaching another 
party about a potentially infringing product could put a patent’s validity and 
enforceability in jeopardy.224 The risk associated with asserting patent rights has 
gone up, and the value has likely gone down.225 There is no point to having a legal 
monopoly when there is no way to safely assert rights under that privilege.  With 
no point to having the monopoly, correspondingly, the value will likely drop across 
the board on patents if there is no safe way to assert patent rights.  Thus, 
MedImmune impacts more than just negotiating licenses; it will likely affect the 
very core of patents and the business associated with them.226
VI. CONCLUSION
MedImmune and its progeny have re-shaped the face of licensing.  It 
destroyed the CAFC’s objective standard for bringing a declaratory judgment 
action and made the standard for bringing an action much more lax than it was 
previously.  This line of cases has effectively redistributed the power in license 
negotiations and existing license agreements.  As things currently stand, any 
licensor/patent owner with any doubts about the validity of their patent or a strong 
urge to avoid litigation, must walk on eggshells around licensees for fear that they 
could be involved in litigation at a moment’s notice.  In addition, the MedImmune
cases have potentially permanently dropped the value of all patents due to the 
increased inability of a patent owner to enforce their rights and the risks associated 
with that enforcement.  These are just some of the impacts that have been noted in 
the two years since the Supreme Court decided MedImmune, more serious side 
effects may be still to come.
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